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Of  neighbours,  partners 
and EU aspirants:  
The  case  of  EU-Georgia  relations 
since the 2003 Rose Revolution 
 
 
Summary 
 
This background brief examines the relations between 
the EU and its eastern neighbours through a case study 
of  Georgia.  What  are  the  underpinnings  and  factors 
driving EU policies such as the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)? Is EU 
membership for these eastern countries the end goal? 
Georgia,  a  small  country  in  the  South  Caucasus,  has 
been thrust into the limelight in the wake of its 2003 
Rose  Revolution  and  its  2008  war  with  Russia,  with 
implications for EU-Georgia relations. This relationship 
is fraught with asymmetric expectations – Georgia has 
been more than won over as part of the EU’s ‘ring of 
friends’,  evident  in  how  its  leaders  and  people  have 
expressed  a  desire  to  join  the  EU.  However  there  is 
currently little if any reciprocal desire on the EU’s part, 
and  understandably  so,  given  the  persistence  of 
Georgia’s territorial conflicts.     2 
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A map of Georgia showing the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (shaded) in the 
aftermath of the August 2008 Georgia-Russia war (Source: public domain).  
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1.  Reconceptualising the EU’s eastern 
neighbourhood after 2004 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The 2004 enlargement round of the European 
Union was the largest in its history with ten 
new  countries  joining  –  Cyprus,  the  Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. This was 
shortly followed by the accession of two more 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007.  
 
Such  a  rapid  expansion  of  the  EU’s  borders 
was met with the ‘objective of avoiding the 
emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead 
strengthening  the  prosperity,  stability  and 
security of all’.
2 The situation surrounding the 
borders  between  Belarus,  Latvia  and 
Lithuania has often been cited in this regard. 
When the latter two Baltic states joined the 
EU on 1 May 2004, their shared borders with 
Belarus became an EU border, literally, in a 
single stroke. This had the effect of disrupting 
                                                      
1  Correspondence  email:  euclhy@nus.edu.sg.  The 
author  wishes  to  thank  the  London  School  of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) Annual Fund; the 
Government  of  Georgia;  James  Barnett  and  the  LSE 
Grimshaw  International  Relations  Club;  Dr  Hans 
Gutbrod and the Caucasus Research Resource Center, 
Georgia; and Dr Yeo Lay Hwee and Assoc Prof Barnard 
Turner  of  the  EU  Centre  in  Singapore.  Nevertheless, 
the  views  and  interpretation  of  events  presented  in 
this brief are solely the author’s, and do not necessarily 
reflect  the  positions  held  by  these  institutions  and 
persons.     
2  European  Commission,  European  Neighbourhood 
Policy,  The  Policy:  What  is  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy? 
(http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm, 
accessed 1/8/2011)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
normal trade relations and immigration flows 
with  the  implementation  of  new,  tighter 
border controls as required by the EU.
3   
 
The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP) 
was  conceived  in  the  lead -up  to  the  2004 
enlargement round. This was followed a few 
years  later  by  the  complementary  Eastern 
Partnership  (EaP)  for  the  EU’s  eastern 
neighbourhood  –  that  is,  the  countries 
formerly termed the ‘Eastern Bloc’ and those 
which were formerly republics of the Soviet 
Union.  Unlike  the  countries  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia  in  South  East  Europe,  for  which 
separate agreements under the  Stabilisation 
and  Association  Process  (SAP)  were 
concluded, the partner countries covered by 
the  ENP  are  considered  less  ready  for  EU 
membership, if eligible at all.  
 
Despite this, questions have still been raised 
as  to  whether  the  ENP  is  a  programme 
intended  to  prepare  some  of  the  EU’s 
neighbours  for  EU  membership  eventually. 
Such questions arise in light of Article 49 of 
the Maastricht Treaty, which states that any 
‘European  country’  that  meets  the 
Copenhagen  criteria  can  qualify  for  EU 
accession.  Does  Georgia  meet  the  cultural 
and  political  criteria  of  ‘European-ness’  to 
become a member of the EU if it indeed fulfils 
the Copenhagen criteria in future?  
                                                      
3 Since 2004, these border issues have been specifically 
addressed  by  Cross-Border  Cooperation  (CBC) 
programmes  as  part  of  the  ENP.  See  European 
Commission,  Development  Aid  and  Co-operation  – 
EuropeAid,  Cross-Border  Cooperation  within  the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhoo
d/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-
border/index_en.htm , accessed 1/8/2011). 
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European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)  
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is 
a foreign policy tool of the EU that provides 
the  framework  for  relations  with  16  of  its 
neighbours  –  Algeria,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan, 
Belarus,  Egypt,  Georgia,  Israel,  Jordan, 
Lebanon,  Libya,  Moldova,  Morocco,  the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia 
and Ukraine.  
 
In  the  European  Commission’s  own  words, 
the ENP ‘goes beyond existing relationships to 
offer  political  association  and  deeper 
economic integration, increased mobility and 
more  people-to-people  contacts’.
4 The  idea 
for the ENP was initiated with the European 
Commission’s  Communication  on  ‘Wider 
Europe – Neighbourhood: A new Framework 
for relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours’,
5 the conclusions of which were 
subsequently  endorsed  by  the  Thessaloniki 
European Council in June 2003. Shortly after 
the ten new member states joined the EU on 
1  May  2004,  a  Strategy  Paper  on  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Policy  was 
released.
6 Subsequently a review of the ENP 
in 2011 called for a new approach involving a 
push  to  conclude  Association  Agreements 
with countries in the eastern neighbourhood 
and to pursue further democratisation, in the 
communication document  ‘A New  Response 
to a Changing Neighbourhood’.
7  
 
                                                      
4  European  Commission:  European  Neighbourhood 
Policy.  The  Policy:  What  is  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy?  
5  European  Commission  (2003)  Wider  Europe  – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 
final, 11/3/2003.  
6 European  Commission  (2004)  European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 
final, 15/5/2004.  
7 European  Commission  (2011)  A  new  response  to  a 
changing  neighbourhood:  a  review  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2011) 303, 25/5/2011.  
While the ENP is an umbrella policy for its 16 
neighbours,  it  operates  chiefly  as  bilateral 
partnerships  through  Action  Plans  agreed 
individually with each neighbouring country. 
These Action Plans are negotiated with each 
country’s specific situation in mind, although 
they are typically comprehensive agreements 
covering  broad  issues  ranging  from  political 
dialogue to economic and social cooperation 
and also specific technical or functional issues 
on,  development,  trade,  and  cooperation  in 
justice  and  home  affairs.  Subsequently, 
progress  on  the  implementation  of  these 
Action Plans is periodically monitored through 
Country Reports prepared by the Commission.  
 
The  ENP  is  not  intended  to  supersede  any 
existing  agreements  signed  between  the  EU 
and  each  partner  country,  such  as  the 
Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreements 
(PCA) or Association Agreements (AA). Rather 
the  ENP  agenda  is  meant  to  be  jointly 
advanced with these agreements where they 
already  exist.  For  the  countries  in  the 
Mediterranean  region  for  instance,  the  ENP 
was an extension of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership  (also  known  as  the  ‘Barcelona 
Process’) and its complementary network of 
Association  Agreements,  which  were 
launched back in 1995.   
 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
 
The  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP),  proposed  by 
Poland  and  Sweden  and  launched  in  May 
2009,  is  a  complementary  initiative  to  the 
ENP for the six countries  that are in Eastern 
Europe and the South Caucasus which were 
former  republics  of  the  Soviet  Union  – 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia, 
Moldova and the Ukraine.  
 
The EaP is essentially the regional counterpart 
of the Union for the Mediterranean, itself a 
relaunched  version  of  the  Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, although the EaP 
does  not  have  a  secretariat  like  its  6 
Mediterranean  cousin.  Yet  another  regional 
initiative  that  complements  the  ENP  is  the 
Black  Sea  Synergy,  created  for  the  seven 
countries surrounding the eponymous water 
body or situated near it.   
 
While the ENP is principally a bilateral policy 
between  the  EU  and  each  partner  country, 
the EaP is predicated on a mix of bilateral and 
multilateral  relations.  The  bilateral 
component  of  the  EaP  presents  an 
opportunity  for  enhanced  cooperation 
between the EU and six partner countries in 
two particular areas – the possibility for deep 
and  comprehensive  free  trade  agreements 
and for gradual visa liberalisation for citizens 
of the six countries.  
 
The  multilateral  component  is  the  main 
novelty of the EaP. From high-level summits 
to forums for local politicians and civil society 
leaders,  the  EaP  presents  opportunities  for 
officials and experts from the EU and their six 
eastern partners to meet. The first meeting of 
foreign  ministers  under  the  EaP  framework 
took place in Brussels in December 2009. All 
these  initiatives  have  been  unprecedented, 
insofar  as  the  EU  had  not  previously 
supported any regional grouping among the 
former  Soviet  republics,  let  alone  initiating 
one.  
 
Competing spheres of influence? EU-Georgia 
relations as a test case  
 
In  this  brief,  EU-Georgia  relations  will  be 
presented as a test case for the ENP and the 
EaP.  Despite being  a  small  country,  Georgia 
was  catapulted  to  the  forefront  of 
international  affairs  when  its  five-day  war 
with Russia in August 2008 brought relations 
between Russia and the West to their chilliest 
since the Cold War.  
 
It examines the interests Georgia and the EU 
have in each other, in the face of competing 
interests  staked  by  Russia  on  the  eastern 
neighbourhood consisting of its former family 
of  Soviet  republics,  which  it  calls  its  ‘Near 
Abroad’.
8 The ENP and the EaP have had the 
effect of arousing Russia’s annoyance that the 
EU  is  making  unwelcomed  inroads  into  its 
‘backyard’.  For  its  part,  the  EU  did  include 
Russia as one of the ‘addressees’ in the ENP 
Strategy Paper along with the other eastern 
neighbourhood  countries,  but  Russia  opted 
instead to develop a partnership with the EU 
through the creation of four ‘common spaces’ 
at the 2003 St Petersburg summit.
9 
 
According to at least one reading however, 
Russia does not actually take the ENP and EaP 
seriously,  despite  Russian  Foreign  Minister 
Sergey Lavrov accusing the EU of trying to 
establish its own sphere of influence.
10 The 
rationale here is that Russia sees the EU as a 
more  neutral  actor  in  the  South  Caucasus 
than the United States or the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and one that has 
not seriously posed a threat to Russia’s policy 
positions on the region’s conflict zones. At the 
same  time,  Russia  does  not  want  any 
‘encroachments’ into its neighbourhood to go 
unaddressed.   
 
For  cynical  observers,  the  ENP  and  EaP  are 
policies  symptomatic  of  the  EU’s  so-termed 
                                                      
8 In  Russian:  Ближнее  зарубежье (blizhnee 
zarubezh’ye), a term first used by Soviet dissidents in 
the 1970s and 80s, it was then used officially in the 
early 1990s, first by the then Russian foreign minister 
Andrey Kozyrev. It is sometimes used interchangeably 
to refer to the member states of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  
9 Viz.  Common  Economic  Space ,  Common  Space  of 
Freedom,  Security  and  Justice ,  Common  Space  of 
External  Security,  Common  Space  of  Research  and 
Education. See: European Union External Action.  EU-
Russia Common Spaces   
(http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/i
ndex_en.htm, accessed 1/8/2011)       
10 Mikhelidze,  Nona  (2010)  Eastern  Partnership  and 
Conflicts in the South Caucasus: Old Wine in New Skins? 
IAI092, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.  7 
‘enlargement-lite’ strategy,
11 in which it offers 
the  eastern  neighbourhood  states  the 
prospect of political and economic alignment 
with the EU while playing down any hopes of 
actual membership. This view was confirmed 
with  the  statement  by  Chris  Patten,  the 
former  European  Commissioner  for  External 
Relations, that 
 
‘Over the past decade, the Union’s most 
successful  foreign  policy  instrument  has 
undeniably  been  the  promise  of  EU 
membership.  This  is  not  sustainable.  For 
the coming decade, we need to find new 
ways to export the stability, security and 
prosperity  we  have  created  within  the 
enlarged Union’.
12  
 
 
2.  Background to Georgia 
 
Georgia  is  a  country  of  around  4.4  million 
people
13 in the South Caucasus  – a small but 
ethnically  diverse  geopolitical  region  which 
includes  Armenia  and  Azerbaijan.  Besides 
these  other  two  countries,  Georgia  also 
shares a land border with Russia and Turkey, 
and is bounded to the west by the Black Sea. 
Formerly a constituent republic of the Soviet 
Union,  Georgia  was  a  member  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS) 
                                                      
11 See for instance: Popescu, Nicu and Andrew Wilson 
(2009)  The  Limits  of  Enlargement-lite:  European  and 
Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood, Policy 
Report,  June  2009,  European  Council  on  Foreign 
Relations.  
12  European  Commission,  Wider  Europe–
Neighbourhood:  Proposed  New  Framework  for 
Relations  with  the  EU’s  Eastern  and  Southern 
Neighbours, p. 9.  
13 This is the figure provided by the Georgian National 
Statistics Office for the year 2010  
(http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=
473&lang=eng, accessed 1/8/2011). It does not include 
the population of the de facto independent regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the combined population 
of  which  has  been  estimated  to  be  approximately 
250,000.   
until  its  withdrawal  following  its  2008  war 
with Russia.           
 
This section aims to offer a broad historical-
political  sketch  of  Georgia,  so  as  to 
understand  its  present-day  Euro-Atlantic 
orientation.  
 
Brief history until 2003 
 
The Georgian nation traces its origins to the 
ancient  kingdom  of  Colchis  which  was 
featured  in  the  Greek  mythological  tales  of 
Jason  and  the  Argonauts.  The  formative 
moment  for  the  Georgian  nation  was  when 
the  Georgian  kingdom  of  Kartli  adopted 
Christianity as its state religion in about A.D. 
330, the second nation in the world to do so 
after neighbouring Armenia. Over the ensuing 
centuries though, control over the territory of 
modern day Georgia switched frequently and 
the territory divided between several empires 
including  the  Arab,  Mongol,  Persian  and 
Ottoman Empires.  
 
From  the  year  1800,  the  South  Caucasus 
region began to be absorbed into the Russian 
Empire. Georgia was briefly an independent 
republic from 1918 to 1921 in the aftermath 
of  the  1917  Russian  Revolution.  Thereafter 
the  Red  Army  captured  Georgia,  and  the 
Bolsheviks  –  the  predecessors  of  the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union – made 
it a republic of the Soviet Union. One of the 
leaders of the Bolsheviks, Joseph Stalin, was 
in  fact  an  ethnic  Georgian  born  in  the 
Georgian town of Gori. As is well-known, he 
eventually assumed leadership of the Soviet 
Union.   
 
As  the  Soviet  Union  was  undergoing 
dissolution,  Georgia  declared  independence 
on  9  April  1991.  The  events  surrounding 
Georgia’s  independence  struggle  had  the 
effect of triggering ethno-territorial conflicts  8 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
14 ending in the 
de facto independence of these regions from 
Georgia  by  1995.  Whereas  the  Abkhaz-
Georgian border was effectively closed after 
the  ceasefire,  South  Ossetia’s  borders  with 
the  rest  of  Georgia  were  open  to  ordinary 
people  while  the  region  was  guaranteed  a 
high level of autonomy from Tbilisi. In both 
regions, the military of the Russian Federation, 
the successor state of the Soviet Union, had 
negotiated  a  role  for  themselves  as 
peacekeepers  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
 
By  1995  Eduard  Shevardnadze,  the  last 
foreign minister of the Soviet Union, and who 
is of Georgian origin, had consolidated power 
as  president  of  Georgia,  having  removed 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia who led the country to 
independence.  However  the  Georgia  he 
presided over was in essence a failing state, 
not least with regions like Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia outside the effective control of Tbilisi. 
Even  for  the  other  parts  of  Georgia, 
Shevardnadze’s  authority  was  consolidated 
only  through  cronyism  and  dubious  deals 
forged with local rulers and business elites, so 
as to weaken the power of warlords.    
 
The 2003 Rose Revolution  
 
Due  to  the  nature  in  which  Shevardnadze’s 
regime  consolidated  its  power,  it  was 
perceived to be rife with corruption over the 
years.  In  addition,  basic  services  in  the 
country  such  as  health  care  and  electricity 
supply  were  poor  and  underfunded.  Out  of 
this landscape, the charismatic figure of the 
young  Mikheil  Saakashvilli  emerged.  Having 
served  as  a  justice  minister,  he  resigned  in 
protest  against  the  corrupt  regime  to 
establish  the  opposition  United  National 
Movement party.  
 
                                                      
14 North Ossetia, on the other hand, is a federal subject 
of the Russian Federation, just as it was similarly an 
autonomous republic of the Soviet Union before 1990.  
In the parliamentary elections of 2 November 
2003,  Saakashvili  and  his  party  were  the 
favourites widely expected to be placed first 
and  hence  form  the  government.  That  was 
exactly  the  result  reported  by  the  exit  poll 
conducted  by  Western  organisations  and 
broadcasted on the pro-opposition television 
channel Rustavi-2. When the Central Election 
Commission  announced  its  own  official 
results  that  placed  Shevardnadze’s  party  in 
first place instead, accusations of falsification 
and electoral fraud were widespread.  
 
Soon  anti-Shevardnadze  groups  led  by  the 
United National Movement party gathered in 
the streets of Tbilisi to stage protests, armed 
with  red  roses  that  became  the  symbol  of 
resistance. The movement was then dubbed 
the  ‘Rose  Revolution’,  the  first  of  other 
‘Colour  Revolutions’  in  the  region,  followed 
with  the  Orange  Revolution  in  Ukraine  and 
the  Tulip  Revolution  in  Kyrgyzstan.  On  22 
November  as  the  new  Georgian  parliament 
was about to be convened, Saakashvili led the 
protestors from the streets and burst into the 
parliament  chamber.  In  dramatic  fashion, 
Saakashvili took to the podium as he clutched 
a  rose  and  shouted  ‘Resign!’  while 
Shevardnadze fled with his bodyguards. The 
next day, Shevardnadze resigned. His post of 
president was taken over by Saakashvili who 
won  the  presidential  elections  in  January 
2004.    
 
The Georgia-Russia War, 2008  
 
Besides  mounting  a  massive  campaign  to 
eradicate  corruption,  Saakashvili’s  other 
priority  in  office  was  ‘to  restore  Georgia’s 
territorial integrity’,
15 as he declared in a key 
speech  on  the  eve  of  his  inauguration.  A 
mediation  campaign  was  launched  to 
                                                      
15 Caucasian  Knot  (2004)  ‘Saakashvili  takes  oath  on 
tomb of King David the Builder’, 24/4/2004 
(http://georgia.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/1991, 
accessed 1/8/2011).  9 
reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia into 
Georgia through diplomatic channels.  
 
In  May  2004  Adjara  –  another  autonomous 
region  of  Georgia,  albeit  one  that  never 
experienced  violent  conflict  –  was 
reintegrated  with  the  rest  of  the  country 
when Saakashvili managed to oust the regime 
of Aslan Abashidze. Saakashvili’s success with 
Adjara  purportedly  spurred  him  to  take  a 
tougher stand on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
despite being warned in private by the United 
States not to resort to armed force.  
 
A  small  series  of  provocations  in  the 
separatist  regions  eventually  spiraled  into  a 
crisis of relations between Georgia and Russia, 
the latter being the guarantors and sponsors 
of the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians. Soon 
rumours began circulating that the Georgian 
military was preparing to take over the two 
breakaway  regions  by  force.  These  rumours 
were  buttressed  by  provocative  military 
actions  by  Georgia  and  skirmishes  between 
Georgian forces and armed local groups that 
had been increasing in intensity since 2006, as 
well as a discernible build-up in the Georgian 
defence spending.  
 
As  the  EU-established  Independent 
International  Fact-Finding  Mission  on  the 
Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) later concluded, 
it  was  the  Georgian  military  which  started 
shelling  Tskhinvali,  the  capital  of  South 
Ossetia, late in the night of 7 August 2008.
16 
The next day, war began as Russian tanks and 
the  Russian  Fifty -eighth  Army  that  was 
stationed  at  the  Russian -South  Ossetian 
border  invaded  Georgia  in  response.  After 
two  days  of  fighting,  the  Russian  forces 
penetrated  deeper  into  Georgian  territory, 
                                                      
16 While  making  this  conclusion,  the  IIFFMCG  report 
noted that the question as to which side fired the first 
shot was moot, given that ‘it was only the culminating 
point  of  a  long  period  of  increasing  tensions, 
provocations  and  incidents’.  See  the  full  report  at 
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html.   
overrunning  the  town  of  Gori,  and  halting 
their advance just 40 miles of the Georgian 
capital  Tbilisi.  Meanwhile  a  second  front 
opened up in Abkhazia in the Upper Kodori 
Gorge  region,  between  Georgian  and 
combined  Abkhaz-Russian  forces.  On  12 
August,  Russian  President  Dmitry Medvedev 
ordered an end to military operations, saying 
its goals have been achieved. That same day, 
French  President Nicholas  Sarkozy,  acting  in 
his capacity of the Presidency of the European 
Council, mediated a ceasefire between Russia 
and  Georgia.  Russian  troops  gradually 
withdrew  to  South  Ossetia  and  they  have 
since remained there.  
 
On  August  26,  Moscow  recognised  the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
a  move  followed  by  only  four  other 
countries.
17  The  vast  majority  of  United 
Nations member states support the territorial 
integrity of Georgia. 
 
 
3.  Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation  
 
Georgia’s  professed  European  identity  has 
been  articulated  without  ambiguity  by 
Saakashvili  in  his  statements  and  speeches. 
Since campaigning for the 2003 parliamentary 
elections,  he  has  consistently  spoken  of 
Georgia’s  Christian  roots  and  its  ‘European 
destiny’.
18 In  his  inauguration  speech  on  25 
January 2004, Saakashvili declared that 
 
[the European] flag is Georgia’s flag as 
well,  as  far  as  it  embodies  our 
                                                      
17 As of August 2011, South Ossetia’s independence is 
recognised  by  Russia,  Nicaragua,  Venezuela,  Nauru, 
while Abkhazia’s independence is recognised by these 
four countries with the addition of Vanuatu.  
18 European Parliament, ‘Georgia's Saakashvili pledges 
peaceful  solution  to  dispute  with  Russia’,  Strasbourg 
plenary session 22-25 November 2010  
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/headlines/conten
t/20101112FCS94327/7/html/Georgia's-Saakashvili-
pledges-peaceful-solution-to-dispute-with-Russia, 
accessed 1/8/2011).   10 
civilization,  our  culture,  the  essence  of 
our  history  and  perspective,  and  our 
vision  for  the  future  of  Georgia… 
Georgia is not just a European country, 
but one of the most ancient European 
countries… Our steady course is toward 
European integration.
19   
 
A  stroll  down  Rustaveli  Avenue,  the  main 
thoroughfare  of  the  Georgian  capital  Tbilisi, 
reveals  the  architecturally  European  face  of 
the city that led to its being dubbed the ‘Paris 
of  the  Caucasus’.
20  More  strikingly,  all 
government buildings and ministerial offices 
fly the EU flag alongside the Georgian flag of 
five red crosses, which was itself decreed as 
the new national flag when Saakashvili took 
office. Even though actual EU membership for 
Georgia is a distant prospect, the EU flag has 
become a banner of its European aspirations 
since  Saakhasvili  and  his  United  National 
Movement party came to power.       
 
Realists may be led to conclude that the Euro-
Atlantic orientation of Georgia’s foreign policy 
is  the  natural  product  of  the  Saakashvili 
administration being a strong American ally. 
Some  even  allege  that  the  Rose  Revolution 
was  covertly  supported  and  funded  directly 
by  the  United  States.  However  Tbilisi’s 
relations  with  Moscow  had  already 
encountered  difficulties  late  in 
Shevardnadze’s  rule,  not  least  when  he 
welcomed  US  troops  onto  Georgian  soil  for 
the first time, on the pretext of cooperation 
with the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ 
after the events of 11 September 2001. Yet 
others trace Georgian-Russian enmity back to 
the  period  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Georgia  from  1918  to  1921,  when  the 
                                                      
19 Quoted  in  Müller,  Martin  (2011)  ‘Public  Opinion 
Toward  the  European  Union  in  Georgia’,  Post-Soviet 
Affairs, 27:1, p. 64.  
20 See for instance: Georgian Association in the USA, 
Inc. History and Culture  
(http://www.georgianassociation.org/HistoryAndCultu
re.asp, accessed 1/8/2011).   
Georgian Menshevik government was battling 
the  Bolsheviks,  or  even  further  back  to  the 
time of the Russian Empire.   
 
Nevertheless,  tensions  with  Moscow  were 
indeed  accentuated  after  Saakhasvili  took 
office  as  president,  through  a  series  of 
manoeuvers  relating  to  the  territorial 
conflicts in Georgia. Georgia’s increased drive 
to  join  NATO  starting  in  2005  precipitated 
confrontation with Russia. That year also saw 
the  start  of  a  particularly  hawkish  period 
marked  by  the  Saakashvili  administration’s 
strong push to settle the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian conflicts on its terms, spurred on by 
its success in resolving the Adjara conflict.  
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
 
Formed in 1949 to counter the military power 
of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization  (NATO)  is  a  political-military 
alliance of 28 countries in North America and 
Europe. The organisation is premised on the 
principle  of  collective  defence,  in  which  ‘an 
armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all’, and its members 
are thereby empowered to use armed force 
to  restore  security.
21 When  West  Germany 
joined NATO in 1955, the Soviet Union quickly 
established the Warsaw Pact, a rival military 
alliance of the Eastern European communist 
states.     
 
Since the end of   the Cold War, the former 
signatories  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  –  Albania, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania,  Slovakia,  and  the  former 
constituent  republics  of  the  Soviet  Union 
Estonia,  Lithuania  and  Latvia  –  have  joined 
NATO.  Georgia’s  military  cooperation  with 
NATO  had  begun  with  peacekeeping 
operations  in  Kosovo  since  1999 and  in  the 
                                                      
21 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty  
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_1
7120.htm, accessed 1/8/2011).    11 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan. In 2004, Georgia concluded an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with 
NATO,  which  committed  itself  to  defence, 
institutional, policy and political reforms, with 
eventual membership in NATO in mind.  
 
Georgia’s  push  for  membership  began  in 
earnest at the NATO Bucharest summit held 
in  April  2008,  where  it  was  hoping  to  be 
awarded  a  Membership  Action  Plan  (MAP) 
along  with  Ukraine.  However  it  was  denied 
the MAP due to some opposition within NATO 
stemming from fear that such a move would 
antagonise  Russia,  which  had  indicated  that 
NATO  membership  for  Georgia  and  Ukraine 
was  a  red-line  issue  for  them.  Nonetheless 
the  summit  declaration  supported  Georgia’s 
and  Ukraine’s  membership  applications  in 
principle.
22  
 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  August  2008  war, 
political dialogue and cooperation between 
Georgia and NATO have intensified, primarily 
through the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC). 
However it is now privately acknowledged on 
both  sides  that  NATO  membership  for 
Georgia, despite being promised at the 2008 
Bucharest summit, will be some years away, if 
possible at all, given the thorny state of affairs 
between Georgia and Russia since the war.
23    
 
European Union (EU) 
 
Georgia’s rhetoric touching on its pursuit of 
EU  membership  to  advance  its  goal  of 
integrating  into  Euro-Atlantic  structures  is 
seen as less provocative compared to rhetoric 
on  NATO  membership. As  recently  as  2005, 
some observers endorsed the opposite move, 
seeing NATO membership as a stepping stone 
towards  EU  membership  in  following  the 
                                                      
22 NATO.  Bucharest  Summit  Declaration.  3/4/2008  
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8
443.htm,  accessed 1/8/2011).   
23 International  Crisis  Group  (2011)  ‘Georgia-Russia: 
Learn to Live like Neighbours’, Europe Briefing no. 65.  
example of Central European states like the 
Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland.
24 Of 
course  the  pre -2008  underst anding  was 
predicated on EU membership criteria being 
more  stringent  than  NATO’s.  But  it  also 
missed  the  point  that  Georgia  values  NATO 
membership  more,  for  strategic  reasons, 
given its uneasy relationship with Russia.  
 
Figures  in  the  Georgian  government  have 
acknowledged that the country is not ready 
for EU membership, nor is their country at the 
heart  of  the  EU’s  agenda.
25 It  is  therefore 
adopting a step-by-step approach, based on 
the current associative agreements with the 
EU like the ENP and EaP, tackling issues such 
as visa liberalisation at this stage.  
 
The legal framework for EU-Georgia bilateral 
relations is the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement  (PCA).  Negotiations  for  the  PCA 
started soon after the EU recognised Georgia 
in  1992,  when  the  country  became 
independent in the wake of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, and against the backdrop of 
EU assistance to Georgia as it dealt with the 
consequences  of  its  internal  conflicts  in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The PCA, which 
entered  into  force  in  1999,  provides  for 
cooperation  in  political  dialogue,  trade, 
investment,  and  economic,  legislative  and 
cultural  cooperation.  Through  the  PCA, 
Georgia and the EU have accorded each other 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, and 
have  agreed  on  the  elimination  of  trade 
quotas  and  the  protection  of  intellectual, 
industrial and commercial property rights. 
 
                                                      
24 For instance, Leonard, Mark and Charles Grant (2005) 
Georgia  and  the  EU:  Can  Europe’s  neighbourhood 
policy deliver? Centre for European Reform, p. 7.  
25 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. ‘Georgian Minister 
Eyes EU Membership in 15 Years’  
(http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia_eu_membershi
p_baramidze/9498036.html, accessed 1/8/2011).  Also: 
author’s interview with an official from the Georgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 4 April 2011.   12 
Among  the  Georgian  populace,  the  support 
for EU membership is high. In a 2009 survey 
conducted  by  the  Caucasus  Research 
Resource  Center,
26  79  per  cent  of 
respondents indicated they would vote for EU 
membership if a referendum were to be held, 
and only two per cent would vote against it. 
Over 50 per cent viewed the EU positively and 
indicated trust in it, the highest percentage in 
the  South  Caucasus  –  the  corresponding 
figures  for  Armenia  and  Azerbaijan  are 
around 30 per cent.   
 
Nevertheless  Georgia  is  not  currently  in 
accession negotiations with the EU, nor is it in 
any  similar  track  like  the  Stabilisation  and 
Association Process (SAP) as are the Western 
Balkan ‘potential candidate’ states of Albania, 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Montenegro,  and 
Serbia.  
 
 
4.  The EU’s interests in Georgia  
 
Building a ‘ring of friends’ 
 
The EU’s interests in Georgia stem primarily 
from its stated – as well as unstated – aims 
behind  the  ENP  and  the  EaP.  As  discussed 
above, the EU has aimed to prepare itself for 
a  ‘Wider  Europe’  in  the  wake  of  the  2004 
enlargement  process,  which  would  entail 
building  a  ‘ring  of  friends’  around  the  EU 
member states – a zone of prosperity and a 
friendly neighbourhood… with whom the EU 
enjoys  close,  peaceful  and  co-operative 
relations’.
27  
 
The  2003  Commission  communication  that 
introduced the idea of a ‘ring of friends’ did 
not  envisage  including  the  South  Caucasus 
                                                      
26 Published  by  the  Eurasia  Partnership  Foundation 
(2009),  Georgian  Public  Opinion  -  Attitudes  towards 
European Integration - Narrative Report. 
27  European  Commission,  Wider  Europe  – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. 
region. By the Commission’s own admission in 
that document, the Southern Caucasus ‘falls 
outside  the  geographical  scope  of  this 
initiative for the time being.’ But as the ENP 
was  formulated  and  evolved,  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan  and  Georgia  eventually  became 
included  – not  as a  result  of  requests  from 
these  countries,  but  as  a  result  of  the 
Commission’s  own  recommendation  later. 
This  led  some  to  label  the  ENP  as  a 
geostrategic  plan  chiefly  concerned  with 
securing  alternative  energy  sources  and 
routes for Europe that would bypass Russia,
28 
a topic that will be discussed below.   
 
The clearest articulation of the EU’s desire to 
spread  its  ‘model’  without  expanding 
membership was apparent in a speech by the 
then  European  Commission  President 
Romano Prodi in 2002 which introduced the 
concept  of  ‘sharing  everything  but 
institutions’.
29  By  extending  its  principles, 
values  and  standards  to  its  neighbouring 
region, the EU also had border and security 
issues in mind.  
 
The allusion to a ‘zone of prosperity’ inherent 
in the ‘ring of friends’ idea would suggest that 
the EU harbours a trade agenda with Georgia. 
Given  the  modest  size  of  the  Georgian 
economy however, trade here can only be a 
peripheral interest for the EU at best. In 2010 
Georgia  was  ranked  only  the  81
st  most 
important trading partner of the EU-27, with 
EU-Georgia trade  accounting  for  only  0.06% 
                                                      
28  Among  others:  Walski,  Krzysztof  (2010)  ‘The 
European Union's Eastern Neighborhood: the Eastern 
Partnership  as  a  Strategy  of  EU  Engagement  and 
Security’, Penn McNair Research Journal, 2:1, Article 5. 
29 Europa  (2002)  ‘Romano  Prodi,  President  of  the 
European Commission: A Wider Europe - A Proximity 
Policy  as  the  key  to  stability  "Peace,  Security  And 
Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU", 
Sixth  ECSA-World  Conference,  Jean  Monnet  Project, 
Brussels,  5-6  December  2002’ 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer
ence=SPEECH/02/619, accessed 1/8/2011).  13 
of  the  EU’s  overall  trade,  or  €1.7  billion.
30 
Indeed, discussions on a possible EU -Georgia 
FTA were initiated as part of the ENP Action 
Plan  by  Georgia,  whereas  the  European 
Commission initially posed strong objection to 
this. The Commission subsequently imposed a 
prohibitively demanding set of preconditions 
for opening FTA negotiations.
31    
 
The EU as conflict manager 
 
The EU has been involved in varying degrees 
and means as a conflict manager in places as 
distant as Aceh, Indonesia, and also closer to 
home  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  in  the 
Israel-Palestine  conflict.  For  Whitman  and 
Wolff,  the  EU’s  interests  in  conflict 
management outside of its borders whether 
as a mediator or a provider of humanitarian 
aid, stem from its aspirations to be a global 
security provider and the responsibilities that 
entails.
32  
 
Its deeper commitment to pursuing peace in 
its neighbourhood comes as a natural priority. 
The  European  Security  Strategy  of  2003 
(ESS),
33  drawn  up  by  the  then  EU  High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security  Policy ,  Javier  Solana ,  for  the 
European Council, noted that ‘frozen conflicts, 
which  also  persist  on  our  borders,  threaten 
regional  stability’,  and  that  ‘violent  conflict, 
weak states where organised crime flourishes, 
dysfunctional  societies  or  exploding 
                                                      
30  European  Commission,  Trade,  Regions:  South 
Caucasus – Georgia, 2010 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/septemb
er/tradoc_113383.pdf , accessed 1/8/2011).   
31 Messerlin,  Patrick,  Michael  Emerson,  Gia  Jandieri 
and  Alexandre Le Vernoy (2010) An Appraisal of the 
EU’s Trade Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours: The 
Case of Georgia, Sciences Po and Centre for European 
Policy Studies.  
32 Whitman, Richard G. and Stefan Wolff (2010) ‘The 
EU as conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its 
implications’, International Affairs, 86: 1, p. 107.   
33 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a 
Better World: European Security Strategy, 12/12/2003.  
population  growth  on  its  borders  all  pose 
problems for Europe’. Indeed the ESS made 
the  specific  recommendation  that  the  EU 
‘should now take a stronger and more active 
interest  in  the  problems  of  the  Southern 
Caucasus’. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s engagement 
in  the  conflicts  over  Abkhazia  and  South 
Ossetia  was  limited  to  humanitarian 
assistance.  The  initial  focus  was  on  the 
European  Community  Humanitarian  Aid 
Office’s (ECHO) funding for food aid for all of 
Georgia  (1992-5),  and  then  progressing  to 
rehabilitation  programmes  for  the  two 
conflict zones.   
 
Since  July  2003  the  EU  has  also  had  an  EU 
Special  Representative  (EUSR)  for  the  South 
Caucasus, whose job is to contribute towards 
conflict resolution  in  the  region,  such as  by 
aiding political and economic reforms.  
 
The EU’s role after the 2008 war 
 
After  the  outbreak  of  the  August  2008 
Georgia-Russia war, the EU markedly stepped 
up  its  involvement  in  Georgia.  The  French 
presidency of the EU at that time was the key 
to brokering a six-point ceasefire plan agreed 
by Georgia and Russia. This involved shuttle 
diplomacy  by  French  President  Nicholas 
Sarkozy  and  the  European  Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso, leading to an 
extraordinary  European  Council  meeting  in 
Brussels  on  1  September,  which  gave  full 
backing  to  the  ceasefire  agreement  and 
committed  the  Union,  ‘including  through  a 
presence  on  the  ground,  to  support  every 
effort  to  secure  a  peaceful  and  lasting 
solution to the conflict in Georgia’.
34 A civilian 
EU  Monitoring Mission (EUMM)  was  rapidly 
established  and  deployed  to  oversee  the 
ceasefire  agreement,  commencing  its 
                                                      
34 Council  of  the  European  Union  (2008),  Presidency 
conclusions’, Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 
1 September 2008, Revised version, 6/10/2008.   14 
activities on 1 October 2008. In the ensuing 
settlement negotiations on the conflict called 
the Geneva process, which began in October, 
the EU continued to play a key role as co-chair 
of the process alongside the UN and the OSCE.   
 
With the EU’s swift action taken in the wake 
of  the  five-day  war,  from  mediating  the 
ceasefire to deploying the EUMM, there was 
widespread  enthusiasm  that  the  EU  had 
finally  ‘made  a  real  breakthrough  in  its 
credibility as an international security actor’,
35 
but this proved to be short-lived. The political 
momentum for a resolution of the Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia conflicts gradually stalled. 
On  Russia’s  side,  their  anticipated  ‘flood  of 
recognitions’ of the independence of the two 
territories simply did not materialise. 
 
The EUMM’s work has been hampered by the 
fact that it has still not been granted access to 
the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
by  their  de  facto  authorities.  Its  monitoring 
activities have therefore been limited to the 
Georgian side of the Administrative Boundary 
Line (ABL).  
 
The  EU  has  also  not  articulated  a  clear 
definition of what ‘conflict resolution’ would 
entail exactly in the context of the Georgian 
territorial  conflicts  since  1991.  Ambiguity  in 
handling  these  conflicts  could  perhaps  be  a 
deliberate  policy,  given  the  thorny  regional 
issues.  Meanwhile  there  remains  a  broad 
agreement that the EU needs to continue its 
engagement  in  the  conflicts,  for  which  the 
prospects  for  resolution  continue  to  be 
illusory.   
 
The EU’s energy policy 
 
One of the top policy priorities for the EU’s 
energy strategy is the avoidance of ‘strategic 
dependence’ – that is, to reduce dependency 
on one main supplier for gas and oil, and to 
                                                      
35 Whitman and Wolff (2010), p. 93.  
develop alternative energy transport routes.
36 
Some EU member states, particularly those in 
Central and Eastern Europe, have an almost 
100  per  cent  dependence  on  Gazprom,  the 
Russian state-owned gas company. The EU’s 
drive  to  diversify  its  energy  sources  was 
accelerated after the energy crisis of January 
2006, when Russia shut down gas supplies to 
Ukraine in the midst of winter.  
 
Georgia has no significant energy reserves of 
its own, but is important as an energy transit-
country.  The  strategic  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC)  pipeline,  which  has  been  pumping  oil 
from the Caspian Sea oil fields of Azerbaijan 
to  the  Turkish  port  city  of  Ceyhan
37 by the 
Mediterranean Sea since 2005, runs  through 
Georgian  territory.  Celebrated  in  popular 
culture through its central role in the plot of 
the 1999 James Bond movie ‘The World Is Not 
Enough’,  the  BTC  pipeline  is  considered  an 
engineering feat, being buried throughout its 
entire  length  of  1,768  km  through  rugged 
terrain. 
 
A  more  direct  route  for  the  pipeline  would 
actually be through Armenia. But because of 
the politics surrounding Azerbaijan’s ongoing 
conflict  with  Armenia  over  the  disputed 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, the course of 
the BTC pipeline makes a detour into Georgia, 
thereby  bypassing  Armenian  territory. 
Crucially  from  the  EU’s  point  of  view,  the 
pipeline avoids Russia and Iran.  
 
There  are  also  other  massive  pipeline 
infrastructure  projects  to  meet  Europe’s 
energy  demands  –  Nord  Stream  and  South 
Stream,  which  are  joint  projects  between 
                                                      
36 Tsereteli, Mamuka (2004), Caspian Gas: Potential to 
Activate Europe in the South Caucasus, Central Asia - 
Caucasus Institute, 25/8/2004  
(http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid
=2611, accessed 1/8/2011).   
37 Ceyhan is the transportation hub for Middle Eastern, 
Central Asian and Russian oil and natural gas which are 
loaded  on  to  supertankers  for  delivery  to  Europe, 
among other destinations.   15 
Gazprom  and  European  companies,  and the 
Nabucco  pipeline,  an  Austrian-led  project 
with no Russian involvement – but these have 
been described as ‘formidable challenges to 
the  balance  of  Europe’s  energy  policy  that 
have gone under-reported in the press’.
38     
 
With  the  capacity  to  transport  one  million 
barrels of oil per day from the Caspian Sea to 
the  European  oil  market,
39 the BTC pipeline 
has had the effect of increasing the strategic 
importance  of  Georg ia  and  the  South 
Caucasus region to the EU. This would be a 
significant  addition  of  oil  that  originates 
neither from Russia or member countries of 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).
40  
 
It would also be prudent not to overstate the 
importance  of  Georgia’s  role  in  regional 
energy politics. Indeed some observers of the 
August  2008  Georgia-Russia  war  rushed  to 
identify the BTC pipeline as the motivation for 
the  hostilities.
41 However the course of the 
pipeline in Georgia was literally  untouched 
during the five days of hostilities, since it lies 
                                                      
38 Dusseault, David (2010) ‘Europe’s triple by-pass: the 
prognosis for Nord Stream, South Stream and Nabucco’, 
Asia Europe Journal, 8:3, p. 383.  
39 2009  figures  from  the  energy  company  BP,  the 
largest  shareholder  (30%)  of  the  BTC  pipeline:  BP , 
Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan Pipeline 
(http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categor
yId=9006669&contentId=7015093, accessed 1/8/2011)   
40 Svante  E.  Cornell,  Mamuka  Tsereteli  and  Vladimir 
Socor  (2005)  Geostrategic  Implications  of  the  Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, in Starr, S. Frederick, Svante E 
Cornell,  eds.  The  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  Pipeline:  Oil 
Window to the West  (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute 
and  Silk  Road  Studies  Program  (CACI-SRSP): 
Washington, DC).  
41  For instance:  Pagnamenta, Robin (2008). ‘Analysis: 
energy pipeline that supplies West threatened by war 
Georgia conflict’, The Times, 8/8/2008 
(http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europ
e/article4484849.ece, accessed 1/8/2011); and Spiegel 
Online (2008) 'Russia Should not Have a Stranglehold 
on Resources', 13/08/2008. 
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,57
1855,00.html, accessed 1/8/2011).    
outside the area of the furthest incursion of 
the Russian army into Georgian territory.
42 It 
would also have been irrational for Russia to 
jeopardise  its  relations  with  Turkey  and 
Azerbaijan by bombing the BTC pipeline.    
 
 
5.  Prospects for deeper integration 
 
There  is  no  clause  in  the  ENP  and  EaP 
documents  that  rules  out  eventual 
membership for the EU’s partner countries. In 
fact the possibility for such an outcome has 
been kept deliberately vague.
43  
 
The criteria for countries wishing to join the 
EU  are  known  as the Copenhagen  criteria, 
named after the 1993 Copenhagen European 
Council summit. These require the candidate 
country to have achieved  stable institutions 
guaranteeing  democracy,  the  rule  of   law, 
human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities; the existence of a functioning 
market economy and the ability to cope with 
competition and market forces within the EU; 
the  ability  to  take  on  the  obligations  of 
membership pertaining to political, economic 
and monetary union.
44  
 
Additionally, article 49 (formerly Article O) of 
the  Maastricht  Treaty   states  that  ‘any 
                                                      
42 Though the BTC pipeline  was shut down two days 
before  the  Georgia-Russia  war  erupted,  due  to  an 
explosion at a segment of the pipe in eastern Turkey. 
This has been widely attributed to action by militants 
of  the  separatist  Kurdish  Workers’  Party  (PKK)  not 
related to the Georgia-Russia war.    
43 ‘The  ENP  remains  distinct  from  the  process  of 
enlargement  although  it  does  not  prejudge,  for 
European neighbours, how their relationship with the 
EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty 
provisions’.  From  European  Commission,  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy.  The  Policy:  What  is  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy?  
44 European  Commission,  Enlargement,  Accession 
criteria 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_proce
ss/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm,  accessed 
1/8/2011).     16 
European  State  which  respects  the  values 
referred to in Article 2 [i.e. respect for human 
dignity,  freedom,  democracy,  equality,  the 
rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights, 
including  the rights  of persons  belonging  to 
minorities]  and  is  committed  to  promoting 
them may apply to become a member of the 
Union’.
45 However,  the  criterion  as  to  what 
constitutes  a  European  state  is  ‘subject  to 
political assessment’.
46  
 
Even  if  Georgia  were  to  fully  meet  the 
Copenhagen criteria and all parties agree that 
Georgia is indeed European, the EU would be 
very  reluctant  to  admit  the  country,  chiefly 
because  of  Georgia’s  unresolved  territorial 
conflicts. With the precedence set by Cyprus 
in  2004,  the  accession  of  a  territorially-
divided  country  to  the  EU  would  never  be 
allowed  to  be  repeated.  Cyprus’s  EU 
accession  not  only  failed  to  resolve  the 
dispute  over  Northern  Cyprus,  as  was  the 
intention,  but  it  has  had  the  effect  of 
complicating the peace process and the EU’s 
relations with Turkey.
47   
 
In  any  case  the  European  electorate’s 
appetite  for  further  enlargement  is 
understandably  low  at  this  time  of  writing, 
with the ongoing financial and debt crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
45 EUR-Lex.  Consolidated  versions  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the  European  Union  (http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008
:115:0001:01:EN:HTML, accessed 1/8/2011) .  
46    European  Parliament.  Briefing  No  23:  Legal 
questions of enlargement  
(  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefin
gs/23a2_en.htm, accessed 1/8/2011).   
47 For  a  discussion,  see   Tocci,  Nathalie  (2004)  EU 
Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution. Catalysing 
Peace  or  Consolidating  Partition in  Cyprus?  (London: 
Ashgate). 
Does Georgia meet the political criteria for 
EU membership? 
 
Georgia is not officially being assessed for the 
Copenhagen criteria since it is not currently in 
any  accession  negotiations.  Nonetheless, 
political,  economic  and  legislative  reforms 
similar to the Copenhagen criteria are being 
monitored  in  the  ENP  partner  countries  by 
the European Commission – such as in their 
ENP  country  reports  –  and  by  independent 
think tanks.    
 
Georgia  has  certainly  seen  a  huge 
improvement in the rule of law since the days 
of  the  Shevardnadze  regime.  However  its 
overall performance in the various aspects of 
the Copenhagen criteria today is mixed. There 
is  even  a  perception  that  Georgia  has 
experienced  a  regression  in  some  of  these 
measures,  if  they  were  ever  properly 
consolidated. A recent report released by the 
think tank the  European  Council  on  Foreign 
Relations  for  instance,  concluded  that  all 
countries  in  the  eastern  neighbourhood 
under  the  ENP  have  ‘gone  in  the  wrong 
direction’ in terms of political development, 
with the exception of Moldova.
48  
 
The European Commission publishes regular 
progress reports on the implementation of 
the ENP for each individual partner country. 
The Commission’s report issued recently for 
the year 2010 noted that Georgia had made 
progress  in  reforming  the  justice  system, 
improving the conduct of elections, increasing 
women’s  rights,  carrying  out  constitutional 
reform,  and  in  curbing  administrative 
corruption,  but  also  noted  that  the 
consolidation of democracy, the protection of 
the  rights  and  integration  of  minorities  and 
                                                      
48 Popescu,  Nicu  and  Andrew  Wilson  (2011)  Turning 
Presence  into  Power:  Europe  in  its  eastern 
neighbourhood,  Policy  Brief,  European  Council  on 
Foreign Relations.   17 
corruption  among  high-ranking  officials 
needed more effort.
49  
 
This section focuses on the political aspects of 
the Copenhagen criteria – namely democracy, 
the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  the 
protection  of  minorities.  The  economic  and 
monetary aspects of the Copenhagen criteria 
would  warrant  a  separate  study,  especially 
since the eurozone crisis at this time writing 
would  render  any  discussion  on  them 
necessarily  complex.  With  Consumer  Price 
Index (CPI) inflation in Georgia at more than 
10% at the start of 2011, it has become more 
challenging  for  the  country’s  monetary 
authorities  to  restrain  from  increasing  base 
interest  rates,  to  act  in  line  with  its 
commitment  to  macro-economic  stability 
under  the  ENP  Action  Plan.  Similarly,  the 
legislative aspect pertaining to the adoption 
of the acquis communautaire is not covered 
here. 
 
Rule of law 
 
Georgia’s  improvement  in  the  rule  of  law 
since the Rose Revolution is perhaps the most 
successful of Saakhasvili’s sweeping reforms. 
The  EU-Georgia  Action  Plan  under  the  ENP 
puts special emphasis on the cooperation in 
the fields of Rule of Law and Justice, and on 
contributing towards security sector reform in 
Georgia.
50 The most well-known success story 
is of police reform. The old Traffic Police was 
entirely disbanded in June 2004, during which 
16,000 officers were literally dismissed in one 
day. Since the Soviet era, the Traffic Police 
and the Ministry of Interior running it had 
been one of the most corrupt institutions in 
                                                      
49  European  Commission.  Implementation  of  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Policy  in  2010  –  Country 
report: Georgia, COM (2011) 303.  
50 Delegation of the EU to Georgia,  Justice,  Freedom 
and Security 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/projects/o
verview/justice_freedom_secu/index_en.htm, 
accessed 1/8/2011).  
the country. The police maintained close links 
to the criminal world, and thus contributed to 
Georgia’s  image  as  a  failing  state.  And 
because  of  their  daily,  direct  contact  with 
ordinary Georgians through their patrols and 
bribe-taking, they became the symbol of the 
corrupt  and  dysfunctional  state  loathed  by 
the citizens.  
 
When the replacement Patrol Police – trained 
and equipped under a whole new system  – 
was  deployed  onto  the  streets  within  one 
month of the disbandment of the old Traffic 
Police,  public  trust  in  law  enforcement 
agencies soared. One oft-cited survey by the 
International  Republican  Institute  indicated 
that public trust in the police had hit 65 per 
cent a few months after the reforms (October 
2004),
51  where  the  figure  traditionally 
hovered  around  10  p ercent.  The  Georgian 
government’s  own  figures  indicate  a  jump 
from 5 to over 90 per cent in public trust in 
the police one year after the reforms.
52  
 
Compared to police reform, the reform of the 
judicial system has been perceived to be less 
successful.  Critics  mainly  cite  the  lack  of 
judicial independence and inconsistencies in 
interpretation and enforcement of legislation. 
However  recent  changes  such  as  the 
provision for judges to be appointed for life 
and the introduction of jury trials promise to 
improve the judicial framework.  
 
In general, observers report that while low-
level  corruption  in  state  services  has 
essentially  disappeared  since  Georgia’s 
                                                      
51 International  Republican  Institute  (2004)  Georgian 
National Voter Study, October 20 to November 3, 2004. 
(http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2004%20Novem
ber%20Survey%20of%20Georgian%20Public%20Opinio
n,%20October%2020-November%203,%202004.pdf, 
accessed 1/8/2011).  
52 President of Georgia. The Office of (2005) ‘President 
Saakashvili  congratulates  Patrol  Police  force  on  one-
year anniversary’  
(http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG
&sec_id=228&info_id=4829, accessed 1/8/2011).    18 
anticorruption  campaign  began  in  2004, 
corruption  among  the political  and  business 
elites is believed to be tackled selectively.
53 As 
an indication of the level of public discontent, 
there  have  been  a  number  of  violent 
demonstrations over the issue of high -level 
corruption,  such  as  the  one  in  2007  cited 
below. Recent reports issued by Transparency 
International  and  Freedom  House  indicate 
that the Georgian law enforcement agencies 
are working to address corruption at the elite 
level, pointing to the lack of transparency in 
media and government financing as the main 
problems.
54  
 
Democracy & human rights  
 
Institutional  reforms  in  Georgia  have  been 
much lauded, but critics charge that politics 
and power are too much centralised around 
the  president.
55 Since  the  Rose  Revolution, 
Saakashvili  and  his  United  National 
Movement party have dominated the political 
landscape, while the political opposition has 
been  fractured.  Nevertheless  this  state  of 
parliamentary  representation  had  been 
achieved  through  an  electoral  process 
described by international observers like the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) to be hugely improved since 
the Shevardnadze regime.  
 
The  low  point  in  Georgia’s  democratic 
transition  was  in  November  2007  when 
demonstrations  against  alleged  corruption 
within  Saakhasvili’s  government  were 
violently cracked down by the police. A state 
                                                      
53 Tsitsishvili,  David  (2010)  Georgia:  a  report,  Civil 
Society Against Corruption.  
54 Aprasidze, David (2011) ‘Georgia’, in Freedom House, 
Nations in Transit 2010 (Freedom House: Washington, 
DC);  Transparency  International  Georgia,  “Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 released: Georgia ranks 68th,” 
26 /10/2010   
(http://www.transparency.ge/en/post/corruption-
perception-index-cpi/corruption-perception-index-
2010-released-georgia-ranks-68th, accessed 1/8/2011) .  
55 Popescu and Wilson (2011).  
of emergency was also briefly imposed. This 
compared  badly  with  how  Shevardnadze’s 
government  had  been  more  restrained  and 
refrained  from  the  use  of  force  against 
protestors during the Rose Revolution. More 
recently  in  May  2011,  anti-Saakashvili 
demonstrations  that  were  cynically  dubbed 
the ‘Silver Revolution’, with the participation 
of many older Georgians who are struggling 
to  cope  with  low  pensions  and  rising  food 
prices, were again marked by violent clashes 
with the police.    
 
Since  the  onset  of  anti-Saakashvili  protests, 
constitutional  reform  has  been  adopted  to 
ensure a more balanced separation of powers. 
In  2010,  the  Georgian  Parliament  adopted 
amendments to the constitution that will see 
the  political  system  shifting  from  a  semi-
presidential  to  a  parliamentary  model  after 
the next presidential elections due in 2013. 
 
The  media  played  an  important  role  in  the 
Rose  Revolution  and  in  the  subsequent 
democratisation  process.  Georgia’s  media 
environment  broadly  meets  international 
standards  today,  but  media  independence 
and  professionalism  has  been  identified  for 
improvement.
56  Each  television  outlet  is 
commonly considered to be biased in favour 
of either the government or the opposition, 
but the pro-government outlets are staffed by 
figures with links to government bodies.  For 
instance,  a  former  director  of  the  pro-
government  Rustavi2  currently  chairs  the 
national  committee  which   regulates  and 
licenses  broadcasters.
57  In  addition, 
ownership and funding of  television stations 
suffer  from  the  lack  of  transp arency.  The 
situation for print media is different however 
– it is widely seen as free and is more diverse 
than television.   
                                                      
56 Aprasidze (2011).  
57 Media.ge, ‘Former Rustavi2 Director becomes GNCC 
Chairman’, 27/6/2009 
(http://ww.media.ge/en/node/35514, accessed 
1/8/2011).  19 
The Public Defender or Ombudsman, whose 
powers were increased in 2010, monitors the 
human  rights  situation  in  Georgia 
independently.  The  Public  Defender’s  office 
has  primarily  raised  concern  over  prison 
conditions  pertaining  to  overcrowding  and 
health care.  
 
Protection of minorities 
 
In  the  protection of  minorities,  the  concern 
often raised about Georgia is its failure to sign 
or ratify the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority  Languages  (ECRML).  The  signing  of 
the Charter represents a commitment on the 
part  of  the  state  party  to  protect  and 
promote  minority  languages  which  are 
regarded  to  be  threatened,  and  to  enable 
speakers of a minority language to use it in 
public life.
58 On being formally admitted to the 
Council of Europe (CoE)
59 in April 1999, Georgia 
pledged to sign and ratify the Charter within a 
year, but has not done so to date. Whereas its 
fellow CoE-member neighbours Armenia and 
Azerbaijan  –  which  are  ethnically  more 
homogenous  –  have  signed  the  Charter 
(additionally  Armenia  has  ratified  it),  multi-
ethnic and multi-lingual Georgia has not.  
 
On the other hand, the debates surrounding 
the  two  most  numerous  national  minorities 
hinge  on  improving  their  proficiency  of  the 
Georgian  state  language.  National  and 
international  observers  agree  that  the 
Armenian and the Azeri minorities which are 
concentrated  in  Samtskhe-Javakheti  and 
Kvemo Kartli regions respectively need to be 
better  integrated  into  Georgian  society. 
Improving instruction in Georgian for them is 
a  key  step  in  achieving  this,  as  well  as  to 
                                                      
58 Council of Europe, Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages. About the Charter  
(http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/aboutc
harter/default_en.asp, accessed 1/8/2011).   
59 The Council of Europe is a body entirely separate 
from  the  EU,  despite  them  sharing  the  same  flag. 
Neither is it to be confused with European Council 
which is an institution of the EU.  
create better job opportunities for them.
60 It 
appears  therefore  that  while  Georgia’s 
adoption of the ECRML would certainly help 
protect the other minority languages that are 
in  danger  of  erosion,  flexibility  and  careful 
balance  should  be  exercised  with  the 
situation  on  the  Armenian  and  Azeri 
languages.  
 
After  the  2008  war,  it  was  widely  expected 
that  the  estimated  26,000  ethnic  Ossetians 
residing throughout Georgia outside of South 
Ossetia  would  suffer  from  a  backlash  of 
oppression,  leading  to  a  massive  exodus, 
much like the situation of the Kosovar Serbs 
after the 1999 Kosovo war. Fortunately, these 
fears have largely not materialised. Since the 
2002  Georgian  census,  the  population  of 
ethnic  Ossetians  in  the  country has  steadily 
declined with emigration primarily to Russia, 
but  this  has  been  linked  more  to  socio-
economic  conditions  rather  than 
discrimination or oppression.
61   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
60 Wheatley,  Jonathan  (2009)  ‘The  Integration  of 
National  Minorities  in  the  Samtskhe-Javakheti  and 
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Presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili’, European Centre for 
Minority Issues, Working Paper # 44.  
61 Sordia, Giorgi (2009)  ‘Ossetians  in  Georgia  in  the 
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6.  Conclusions: three years after the 
war 
 
On the recent third anniversary of the start of 
the  Georgia-Russia  war,  the  International 
Crisis  Group  released  a  briefing  that 
characterised  Tbilisi-Moscow  relations  to  be 
in  a  state  of  ‘total  mutual  distrust’.
62 This 
would appear to present a tricky situation for 
the EU as it balances the aims of the ENP with 
its  engagement  with  Russia.  However  the 
Obama  administration  of  the  United  States 
has  managed  to  maintain  its  ‘reset’  policy 
with Russia while concurrently calling for the 
end of its ‘occupation’ of Georgian territory.   
 
The EU can do the same, not least because of 
the open-ended nature of the ENP and EaP. It 
has no wish to pursue confrontational policies 
with Russia such as in competing for influence 
in  the  ‘Near  Abroad’.  Neither  is  there  any 
appetite within the EU currently to consider 
accession for Georgia – the ongoing territorial 
conflicts in Georgia are the major stumbling 
blocks, as are the current eurozone difficulties 
back home. The EU as a whole has also has 
become  less  enthusiastic  in  supporting 
Georgia’s NATO membership bid.   
 
On the other hand, the Georgian leadership 
and its public are still very enthusiastic about 
any prospect of joining the EU – they view the 
EU  more  positively  than  many  EU  member 
states  do.  There  is  nothing  to  suggest  that 
Georgians are getting disenchanted with the 
EU,  but  should  that  ever  be  the  case,  the 
drive  for  continued  political  and  economic 
reforms in Georgia could diminish. The worst 
possible  outcome  of  that  would  be  greater 
instability in a delicate region that has been 
plagued  by  conflict  since  the  dissolution  of 
the Soviet Union.  
 
 
                                                      
62 International  Crisis  Group  (2011)  ‘Georgia-Russia: 
Learn to Live like Neighbours’, Europe Briefing no. 65.  
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